Author Topic: The Ultimate Guide to Windows 7 Security 2 of 2  (Read 874 times)

Offline javajolt

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The Ultimate Guide to Windows 7 Security 2 of 2
« on: April 22, 2010, 09:25:07 PM »
continued from part 1

Naturally, application and Website compatibility issues will guide how quickly Windows shops can move to the new browser -- but run some tests. I have no shortage of clients who are still clinging to IE 6 and haven't conducted any compatibility testing in over a year. Often when I goad them into retesting their troublesome application with IE 8, it works.

Multiple active firewall policies.

Prior to Windows 7, when a user had multiple network interfaces active, only one Windows Firewall profile (i.e. Home, Domain, Work, or Public) could be used. This created potential security vulnerabilities, such as when a computer was both wired to the local network domain and connected to a less restricted wireless network. Windows 7 can now detect multiple networks and apply the appropriate firewall profile to the right interface.

Improved System Restore. System Restore now includes the user's personal content files. Older versions backed up and protected only the Windows system files. System Restore also allows you to see what files would be restored in each version of the System Restore files. It's not perfect, but it's nice to see what will occur if you were to choose a particular restoration point.

Smooth remote access. DirectAccess (http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/network/dd420463.aspx) allows remote users to securely access enterprise resources (such as shares, Websites, applications, and so on) without connecting to traditional types of VPNs. DirectAccess establishes bidirectional connectivity with a user's enterprise network every time a user's DirectAccess-enabled portable computer connects to the Internet, even before the user logs on. The advantage here is that users never have to think about connecting to the enterprise network, and IT administrators can manage remote computers even when the computers are not connected to the VPN.

Once DirectAccess is enabled, when a user's computer connects to the Internet, it's as though he or she is on the organization's local network. Group policies work, remote management tools work, and automatic push patching works.

Unfortunately, DirectAccess has fairly involved requirements, including Windows Server 2008 R2 (to act as the RAS server), Windows 7 Enterprise or Ultimate clients, PKI, IPv6, and IPSec. But as companies put the necessary pieces into place (http://www.infoworld.com/d/windows/microsoft-directaccess-ugly-truth-797), they should look into using DirectAccess as their default VPN technology for Windows 7 and later clients

Managed Service Accounts. Service accounts are often highly privileged, but difficult to manage. Best-practice recommendations dictate changing service account passwords frequently, so as to avoid the risk of password attacks. However, Windows service accounts often require two or more coordinated, synchronized password changes in order for the service to continue running without interruption; prior to Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, service accounts were not easy to manage. If a service account is enabled as a Managed Service Account (http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd560633(WS.10).aspx), Windows will take over the password management and simplify management of Kerberos SPN (Service Principal Names).

Like DirectAccess, Managed Service Accounts have a lot of requirements, including a schema update and mandatory use of PowerShell 2. Still, if service accounts are a hassle in your environment -- and you know they are -- consider enabling this new feature when your infrastructure is prepared.

Virtual Service Accounts. Virtual Service Accounts (http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd548356(WS.10).aspx) (VSAs) are related to Managed Service Accounts in that Windows takes over the password management. However, VSAs are for local service accounts and don't require a schema update or nearly the amount of effort to configure and use.

When a VSA controls a service, the service accesses the network with the computer's identity (in a domain environment), which is much like what the built-in LocalSystem and Network Service accounts do, except that VSAs allow each service to have its own separate security domain and corresponding isolation.

Creating a Virtual Service Account is pretty easy. Open the Services console (services.msc) and modify the service's logon account name so that it's the same as the service's short name, such as ex. NT SERVICE\ServiceName$. Then restart the service. That's it.

When the infrastructure can support it, consider using Managed and Virtual Service Accounts functionality to manage service account password security.

AppLocker application control

The leading cause of malware infections may surprise you. Most machines aren't exploited due to missing patches (although this is the second biggest cause), unpatched zero days (almost never a factor), drive-by downloads, or misconfigurations. Nope, most systems are infected because users are duped into intentionally installing programs that a Website or email says they need. These socially engineered Trojans come in the guise of antivirus scanners, codecs required for a media player, fake patches, and just about any other bait the bad guys can concoct to lure end-users into installing their Trojan executable.

The most effective means of thwarting these threats in an enterprise environment is preventing end-users from installing unapproved programs. If you leave the decision up to end-users, they will almost always make the wrong choice. If they didn't, malware wouldn't be nearly as common as it is today.

Microsoft's most sophisticated solution to the problem is AppLocker, an application-control feature included in Windows 7 (Ultimate and Enterprise editions) and Windows Server 2008 R2. AppLocker is an improvement on the Software Restriction Policies (SRP) introduced with Windows XP Professional. AppLocker allows you to define application execution rules and exceptions based on file attributes such as path, publisher, product name, file name, file version, and so on. You can then assign policies to computers, users, security groups, and organizational units via Active Directory.

Configuring AppLocker. You can configure AppLocker locally using the Local Computer Policy object (gpedit.msc) or via Active Directory and Group Policy Objects (GPOs). AppLocker relies on the built-in Application Identity service, which is normally set to manual startup type by default. Administrators should configure the service to start automatically.

Within the local or group policy object, AppLocker is enabled and configured under the \Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Application Control Policies container.

By default, AppLocker rules do not allow users to open or run any files that are not specifically permitted. First-time testers will benefit by allowing AppLocker to create a default set of "safe rules" using the Create Default Rules option. The default rules authorize all files in Windows and Program Files to run, along with letting members of the Administrators group run anything.

One of the most notable improvements over SRP is the ability to run AppLocker against any computer using the Automatically Generate Rules option to quickly create a baseline set of rules. In a few minutes, dozens to hundreds of rules can be produced against a known clean image, saving administrators anywhere from hours to days of work.


Running by the rules. AppLocker supports four types of rule collections: Executable, DLL, Windows Installer, and Script. SRP administrators will notice that Microsoft no longer has the registry rules or Internet zones options. Each rule collection covers a limited set of file types. For example, executable rules cover 32- and 64-bit .EXEs and .COMs; all 16-bit applications can be blocked by preventing the ntdvm.exe process from executing. Script rules cover .VBS, .JS, .PS1, .CMD, and .BAT file types. The DLL rule collection covers .DLLs (including statically linked libraries) and OCXs.

If no AppLocker rules for a specific rule collection exist, all files that share the same format are permitted to run. However, once a rule for a specific collection is created, only the files explicitly allowed in the rule can execute. For example, if you create an executable rule that allows .EXE files in %SystemDrive%\FilePath to run, only executable files located in that path are permitted to run.

AppLocker supports three types of rule conditions for each rule collection: Path Rules, File Hash Rules, and Publisher Rules. Any rule condition can be used to allow or deny execution, and it can be defined for a particular user or group. Path and File hash rules are self-explanatory; both accept wild card symbols. The Publisher rules are fairly flexible and allow several fields of any digitally signed file to be matched with specific values or wild cards. By using a convenient slider bar in the AppLocker GUI, you can quickly replace the specific values with wild cards. Each new rule conveniently allows one or more exceptions to be made. By default, Publisher rules will treat updated versions of files the same as the originals, or you can enforce an exact match.

Rules for exceptions. If you need to make a rule for a file type that is not defined in AppLocker's policy table, you'll have to use some creativity to get the desired effect. For example, to prevent Perl script files with the .PL extension from executing, you would have to create an executable rule that blocked the Perl.exe script interpreter instead. This would block or allow all Perl scripts and require some resourcefulness to gain finer-grained control. This is not a unique issue, as many other application control products have the same sort of limitation.

AppLocker's configuration and rules can easily be imported and exported as readable XML files. Plus, the rules can be quickly cleared in an emergency, and everything can be managed using Windows PowerShell. Reporting and alerting are limited to what can be pulled from the normal event logs. But even with the limitations, AppLocker gives up-to-date Microsoft shops an effective way to prevent users' missteps from compromising their machines -- not to mention the company network.

Software makers routinely sacrifice some security for the sake of usability, and Microsoft is no exception. I've built a career on teaching people how to harden Microsoft Windows over its default state. But with Windows 7, most of that old advice is no longer necessary. Microsoft now delivers a product that is significantly more secure out of the box. Administrators don't have to download NSA security templates or modify the system in any way to make users fairly secure from the start. In most cases, they simply need to know what security capabilities Microsoft provides and how to put them to work.

source:pcworld
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« Last Edit: April 22, 2010, 09:32:03 PM by javajolt »